long-lived land-use and vehicle purchase decisions. Before long the road may again fill to capacity and steadily deteriorate. Generalizing from this example, the trillion dollars spent over the next 20 years might result in expanded transportation capacity that eventually faces the same problems as before. This is an illustration of Downs's (1962) law: On urban commuter expressways, peak-hour traffic congestion rises to meet maximum capacity, because commuters shift from less preferred modes and times of day.
This cycle can be broken only if infrastructure is priced and invested in more efficiently. If the pothole-laden road is kept to two lanes when it is repaved but vehicles are required to pay efficient tolls based on congestion and pavement wear, then the road's capacity is far less likely to be exceeded during peak periods and its pavement will remain in good condition. Making efficient use of current transportation capacity will reduce the need for massive public investment in airports and roads and will prevent the recurrence of infrastructure problems.
Surprisingly, the belief of most economists that public infrastructure spending should be substantially increased is not based on efficient pricing and investment principles. Instead, it appears to be based on either personal observations or on a suspicion that because uncongested infrastructure is a public good, society has tended to invest too little in it. Both perspectives have diverted many economists and policymakers from realizing there are surprisingly large but plausible benefits from efficient infrastructure pricing and investment.
These benefits arise because airports and roads are characterized by pricing systems that do not reflect economic costs and by poor design decisions that have resulted in higher costs of use. If road and airport systems are priced and invested in efficiently, then the long-run requisite increases in investment are quite modest, the systems would be roughly self-financing in places where some congestion is optimal, and the federal budget deficit is reduced. Efficient infrastructure policy can also complement the beneficial effects that deregulation of the transportation industries has had on competition and firms' operations, and help to address the primary sources of current discontent with deregulation.
The Theory of Efficient Infrastructure Policy
Transportation infrastructure provides capacity, in the form of traffic lanes and runways, for highway and air trips, as well as durability, in the form of thick pavement, to facilitate trips in heavy motor vehicles and large aircraft. Users of the infrastructure impose costs on themselves and others by contributing to congestion, which increases travel time, and by wearing out the infrastructure, which necessitates maintenance expenditures to repair pavement and vehicles.
Efficient infrastructure policy maximizes the difference between social benefits and the costs of use, including the costs that users impose on others, by specifying pricing guidelines to regulate demand and investment guidelines to specify design. (Winston (1985) presents a mathematical derivation of these guidelines.)
Although the literature on optimal pricing and investment has a long and distinguished history that dates back to the writings of Pigou and Knight among others (see Winston (1985) for a survey), Mohring and Harwitz (1962) were the first to determine optimal pricing and investment policies in a rigorous long-run framework. Although recent work has extended their model to account for demand uncertainty, lumpy investment and so on, their basic insights remain intact. The efficient marginal cost pricing rule recognizes that when infrastructure users make travel decisions, they will ignore their contributions to congestion and infrastructure wear. As a result, the social costs of a trip will exceed private costs, and the infrastructure authority must therefore set congestion tolls and infrastructure wear charges to close this gap. The efficient investment rule calls for capacity and durability to be produced to the point where the marginal benefit from increasing investment in each dimension equals its marginal cost. The pricing and investment rules jointly constitute an efficient long-run policy, in which a user's full marginal cost is determined at the optimal level of capacity and durability.
Mohring and Harwitz also showed that the financial viability of a public infrastructure facility under optimal pricing and investment depends upon its cost function. If capacity and durability costs are jointly characterized by constant returns to scale, then the facility's revenue from marginal cost pricing will fully cover its capital and operating costs. If costs are characterized by increasing returns to scale, then marginal cost pricing will not cover costs; conversely, if costs are characterized by decreasing returns to scale, marginal cost pricing will provide excess revenue. The analysis that follows discusses the effects of implementing optimal pricing and investment guidelines.
Efficient Highway Pricing and Investment
The United States has nearly four million miles of roads, but roughly half of the nonlocal roads are currently in fair or poor condition, and traffic during commuter rush-hours approaches capacity on one-half of the urban interstates and one-third of the other main arterial highways (Small, Winston, and Evans, 1989) . Efficient highway pricing and investment could dramatically improve the condition and performance of our roads, while requiring only a small increase in capital spending.
Historically, gasoline taxes have been used to charge vehicles for their use of the roads and to finance expenditures. The gasoline tax was a reasonable way to raise revenue as long as roads were uncongested and in good condition. But fuel tax receipts fluctuate with economic conditions and fuel prices, and recent shortfalls in gas tax revenues have made it increasingly necessary to supplement the gas tax with state and local revenues.
1 These periodic shortfalls and continual uncertainty are one reason to move away from the fuel tax as a source of highway revenue. A more important reason is that the fuel tax does not reflect the pavement damage and congestion caused by vehicles.
Pavement Wear Charges
Pavements become worn as vehicles pass over them and eventually require resurfacing. Pavement damage itself depends on vehicle weight per axle, not total vehicle weight. The damage caused by an axle is defined in terms of the number of "equivalent standard axle loads" (esals) causing the same damage; the standard is a single axle of 18,000 pounds. Small and Winston (1988) report that this damaging power rises exponentially to the third power with its load. (This differs from the conventional belief that the damaging power rises exponentially to the fourth power.) Thus, for example, the rear axle of a typical 13-ton van causes over 1000 times as much damage as that of a car. Since trucks and buses cause almost all of the pavement damage, discussion of pavement wear charges is usually limited to them.
A marginal cost pavement wear charge can be assessed by multiplying a vehicle's esal-miles by the marginal cost of an esal-mile. For example, Small, Winston, and Evans (1989, p. 42 ) estimated the (average) marginal cost of an esal-mile on rural interstate highways to be 1.5 cents.
2 Thus, a truck equivalent to 2 standard axles traveling 100 miles on a rural interstate would accrue 200 esal-miles and a charge of $3.
3 Such a pavement wear charge would reflect much more accurately the damage caused by vehicles using the road. It would also give truckers an incentive to reduce axle weights by shifting to trucks with more axles, thus extending pavement life and reducing highway maintenance expenditures.
The fuel tax currently in use provides truckers with the opposite incentive: the tax rises with a vehicle's axles, since trucks with more axles require larger engines and get lower fuel economy. Another counterproductive incentive is that many state turnpikes charge more for a given weight if it is carried on a vehicle with many axles.
1 Tolls are levied on some roads and eight states have adopted taxes that assess trucks according to their total weight and distance traveled, but such charges account for only a small share of highway revenues.
2 The National Cooperative Highway Research Program calculated the average maintenance cost per esal-mile to be 1.6 cents (Transportation Research Board, 1986) . 3 New devices for weighing trucks in motion and improvements in microelectronic identification make it possible for firms and auditors to tabulate esal-miles accurately.
Optimal Pavement Durability
The damage that a truck does to a pavement depends not only on its axle weight but also on the durability (thickness) of the pavement. 4 Pavement thickness has been strongly influenced by guidelines from the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO). Small and Winston (1988) examined these recommendations, and found that AASHTO had failed to incorporate economic optimization into the design procedure (failing to minimize the sum of capital and maintenance costs) and had developed a relationship between pavement life and pavement thickness that was statistically flawed. As a result, they found that optimal thicknesses were significantly higher than current thicknesses, especially for heavily traveled interstates. For example, the optimal thickness for heavily traveled rigid concrete pavements is 13.8 inches compared with AASHO's estimate of 11.2 inches. Increasing thickness by 2.6 inches more than doubles the life of the pavement. Greater road thicknesses would substantially reduce annual maintenance expenditures and, because they would lower the marginal cost of an esal-mile, would also soften the impact of efficient pavement wear taxes on truckers.
The economic effects of building roads to optimal durability and of charging marginal cost pavement wear taxes to truckers are shown in Table 1 . The effects of the first-best policy are shown in the first column of the table, while columns two and three show the results of partial implementation. Gains in net welfare from the first-best policy total $7.75 billion annually (in 1982 dollars), nearly 18 percent of total 1982 highway expenditures. The source of these benefits is a huge, roughly 75 percent, annual reduction in maintenance costs of nearly $10 billion, which is achieved with only a $1.2 billion annualized increase in capital costs. This policy is also politically attractive because it entails little redistribution; in fact, all major highway interests gain. Truckers and their customers gain because increased durability lowers the efficient road-wear charges from the charges that apply on today's roads. The public sector gains because trucking firms distribute their loads over more axles (change vehicle types) reducing standard loadings (esals) by 38 percent, reducing highway maintenance expenditures. Railroads gain slightly from an increase in traffic, 5 and the federal government's budget balance is improved because the reductions in maintenance expenses greatly offset the loss in highway revenues and increase in capital expenses.
The table also shows the importance of combining optimal pricing and investment. Setting efficient pavement wear taxes at current highway durability (middle column) would produce a smaller welfare gain and generate substantial 4 Besides making pavement thicker, durability can also be improved by improving drainage, using better construction materials and other methods. Aging and weathering leave a pavement more vulnerable to heavy loads. 5 Railroads gain because truck charges tend to rise on intercity traffic shipped long distances in large quantities; hence their business grows despite a small overall decrease in truck charges. redistribution from the trucking industry to the public treasury. This finding confirms that truckers are currently being undercharged for their use of the roads, but it also reveals how inadequate infrastructure investment can penalize an industry.
Building roads to optimal durability while maintaining current pricing (last column) also produces a smaller welfare gain and requires greater capital outlays. Because optimal investment is a long-run policy and the benefits from reduced maintenance expenses will be seen only several years after initial capital outlays, the present value of which must all be incurred when a road is upgraded, extra capital expenses could arouse short-term budgetary concerns. Nonetheless, society would save $4 for every $1 spent, including interest, which is a healthy return.
Congestion Charges
Regardless of what policies are implemented to fight traffic congestions -from high-occupancy vehicle lanes to subsidies for public transit-delays get longer and drivers and passengers get angrier. At first sight, increasing highway capacity may appear as sensible as increasing highway durability, but capacity and durability inadequacies have different effects on road users. Few vehicles are discouraged from using a road because of its durability problems, so optimal durability produces benefits without significantly increasing use. On the other hand, because many motorists are discouraged from using a congested road, traffic will be attracted when capacity is expanded to relieve congestion. Benefits may be accrued by expanding capacity but congestion will persist in the long run (Downs's law). The only way to reduce congestion permanently is to set an explicit price for capacity. 6 Congestion pricing has been advocated by economists for many years, but policymakers have either ignored it or dismissed it on political and practical grounds. For example, congestion pricing is not mentioned in Time 's (1988) eight-page cover story on gridlock. Ross Sandier, New York City Commissioner of Transportation (Pitt, 1989) , dismissed the idea by saying, "What would you do-put tolls on all the highways?" However, Small (1983) shows that objections by those who protest that lower income drivers would be unfairly penalized are unfounded. If toll revenues are used to lower property taxes, invest in public transit, or replace registration fees or fuel taxes, congestion pricing can benefit all income classes. Objections that tolls are impractical are also overstated. Congestion tolls varying by time of day, and imposed when congestion would otherwise persist, can be implemented without disrupting a traveler's journey. An automated vehicle identification (AVI) system, in which an electronic number plate is mounted underneath each vehicle, can be used to transmit a vehicle's numbered identification to a control center each time it passes over a power loop embedded beneath a toll site. The vehicle owner is then sent a monthly bill similar to a phone bill. Such a system has been tested in Hong Kong and found to perform exceptionally well. A sample of conclusions from the test includes the following: more than 99.7 percent of vehicles crossing a given toll site were correctly identified; security features could detect attempted fraud; and manual supplementary police enforcement at toll sites was proven feasible (Catling and Harbord, 1985) . In the United States an AVI system is currently operating on the North Dallas Tollway and in New Orleans.
Because the effects of congestion pricing vary widely by locale, owing to different traffic densities and road systems, most studies of its effects have been site-specific. But a study by Lee (1982) made a rough estimate of the effect of adopting congestion pricing nationwide and found that it would generate $5.65 billion (1981 dollars) in annual net benefits, mostly in the form of annual travel delay savings of approximately one billion vehicle-hours. If congestion pricing were accompanied by optimal investments in road capacity, then annual net benefits would be even higher and the initial redistribution from road users to the road authorities would probably be less.
Highway Finance and Additional Benefits
Although efficient road pricing and investment would generate substantial benefits, one must estimate the degree of scale economies in highway production to determine whether this policy would enable highways to be financially self-sufficient. Highways produce two "products:" traffic volume requiring capacity (number of lanes) and standard loadings requiring durability (thickness). Determining the economies of scale in this multiproduct case requires finding the economies for each specific product, and then the economies of joint production, commonly referred to as economies of scope. Small, Winston, and Evans (1989) find strong economies associated with producing standard loadings, because a pavement's ability to withstand traffic increases far more than proportionally with its thickness. They find evidence from the literature that there are mild economies from producing traffic volume. (A common explanation is that capacity goes up faster than the number of lanes; for example, two lanes in a given direction have more than twice the capacity of one lane.) However, they also find diseconomies of scope from jointly producing volume and standard loadings, because as the road is made wider to accommodate more traffic, the cost of any additional thickness required to handle heavy vehicles rises, since all lanes must normally be built to the same thickness. The result of combining these components is that the product specific economies are virtually offset by the diseconomies of scope, which leads to approximately constant returns to scale in highway production.
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These constant returns to scale imply that urban roads that are sometimes congested could be self-financing in the long run. For uncongested rural roads, additional charges such as license and registration fees would be required to attain a balanced highway budget.
This finding reveals an important additional benefit from congestion pricing. If efficient marginal cost pricing for road wear is undertaken alone, the road authority would face a deficit for urban roads, as well as rural roads, because of the economies of pavement durability.
8 But when efficient road wear 7 Small, Winston and Evans (1989) discuss the possible efficiency gain from a road system that separates truck and auto traffic, which is motivated by their finding of diseconomies of scope. Such a system could be like the split of autos and trucks on the New Jersey Turnpike outside of New York City. 8 Small, Winston and Evans (1989) find that the "pavement deficit" is reduced by optimal pavement wear pricing and investment from its current level of $16.16 billion (1982 dollars) to $9.84 billion pricing is combined with efficient congestion pricing, the (marginal) cost of building the pavement itself is effectively charged twice: once from trucks because they require a thicker pavement and once from cars because they require a wider pavement. The result is that losses from pavement durability economies are eliminated. As a further benefit, congestion pricing could substantially reduce the public transit operating deficit, which approached $9 billion in 1985 according to the Urban Mass Transportation Administration. Higher congestion tolls will cause some motorists to shift to public transit. For example, Viton (1983) finds that congestion pricing in the San Francisco Bay Area would raise mass transit's share of downtown commuters by 10-20 percentage points. This increased ridership will probably lead to buses or trains running more frequently, which will increase convenience and allow transit agencies to raise fares above inefficiently low levels but still attain more ridership.
Efficient highway infrastructure policy could also complement the effects of trucking deregulation. Instituted in 1980, motor carrier deregulation has benefited shippers by some $14 billion annually (1988 dollars) in lower shipping costs and better service (Winston, Corsi, Grimm, and Evans, 1990) . Because of shippers' increased use of just-in-time inventory methods, which attempt to keep inventories to a minimum by bringing in raw materials just in time for production, frequent and reliable service has become especially important. Deregulation has also stimulated the trucking industry to make innovations in equipment, routing, scheduling, and communications.
Congested and damaged roads thwart the effectiveness of carrier innovations, cause travel delays that disrupt the just-in-time inventory process, and raise carrier operating costs through wasted fuel and vehicle damage. All these costs are eventually borne by consumers. Some recent proposals to combat congestion and pollution would ban trucks from downtown areas during certain parts of the day and raise shipping costs even higher. Efficient highway infrastructure policy could supplant potentially counterproductive proposals, and facilitate carriers' continuing efforts to minimize shipping costs.
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Efficient highway infrastructure policy is designed to make the best use of scarce durability and capacity. Scarce durability arises because roads can only withstand a finite number of standard loadings before they need resurfacing. (1982 dollars) . The pavement deficit is defined for the optimal and current policy as the difference between tax revenues and the annualized value of resurfacing expenditures and the cost of the paving material itself.
Although they are not analogous to the problems with publicly owned roads, infrastructure problems could also arise in railroad freight service because rail infrastructure is privately owned and maintained. Winston, Corsi, Grimm, and Evans (1990) point out that rail's financial performance has improved because of deregulation and that no major changes in rail policy are currently warranted. But they also suggest that a radical policy initiative, separating ownership of the rail infrastructure from ownership of the operating companies, could be necessary in the event of an economic downturn to preserve rail's financial viability and to facilitate sufficient railroad competition.
Efficient road wear pricing attempts to reduce loadings by forcing shifts to trucks with fewer loadings; efficient investment recommends road design that allows roads efficiently to withstand a greater number of loadings. Each policy extends road life and saves society maintenance expenses; together they reduce maintenance expenses even more and, most importantly, they minimize redistribution and thus political problems. Scarce capacity is effectively rationed by congestion pricing; such capacity only can be used by those motorists willing to pay an efficient premium for it. With efficient highway infrastructure policy in place, authorities are able to make efficient decisions about whether building new roads can be economically justified.
Efficient Airport Pricing and Investment
Airport congestion and flight delays are receiving increasing public attention. The Department of Transportation has tried to coax airlines into improving their reliability by publicizing each carrier's on-time performance. Many observers argue the problem stems from a lack of airport capacity, citing the fact that no new major airports have been built since 1974. There are many supporters of federal subsidies for a new Denver airport, estimated to cost $2.5 billion.
Although additional airport capacity is not likely to attract as much traffic as additional highway capacity, the tremendous increase in aircraft departures of more than 25 percent during the past decade, partly spurred by deregulation, and the high cost and long lead times associated with new airports suggest that society will be faced with a difficult and expensive catch-up task if it commits itself to reducing air congestion by building more airports. A less costly and more effective solution is to price and invest in existing airports more efficiently.
Efficient Runway Pricing and Capacity
The most common way of assessing landing fees at airports is by aircraft weight. Thus, a commercial jumbo jet pays considerably more to land during a given hour than a small private plane (general aviation). Weight-based landing fees were probably a reasonable way to allocate airport costs and raise revenue when airports were uncongested, but today, the principal cost that an aircraft imposes when it takes off or lands is that it delays other aircraft. (Runway damage caused by aircraft is small.) Morrison and Winston (1989b) found that this delay can be substantial. For example, the elasticity of average departure delay, defined as the percentage change in average departure delay caused by a 1 percent change in aircraft departures, is 2.9 for commercial carriers. This is similar to general aviation's elasticity of 2.5. Current weight-based landing fees undercharge aircraft in inverse proportion to their weight because they do not account for the congestion externality. An airport's capacity is primarily determined by its number of runways, although terminal facilities and gate space can also have some effect. If an airport already owns the land, an additional 10,000 foot × 150 foot runway can be constructed for roughly $40 million in 1987 dollars (Morrison and Winston, 1989b) . Optimal runway capacity is reached when the marginal cost of an additional runway is equated with the marginal benefit of reduced delay. The benefits of reduced delay are mainly the time saved by air travellers. Morrison and Winston (1989b) estimate average delay to be just a few minutes at some airports but as high as 27 minutes at New York (La Guardia) airport. They also estimate commercial air travelers' hourly value of time to be $42 (1988 dollars) and account for the number of passengers carried by different types of aircraft. Thus, for example, the passenger delay cost imposed on a commercial jet landing at La Guardia approaches $2,000. The effects of replacing weight-based landing fees with marginal cost congestion fees and of building the optimal number of runways at airports is shown in Table 2 . 10 The effects of efficient runway pricing and investment are shown in the first column of the table, and the effects of adopting efficient runway pricing at current runway investment are shown in the second column.
Optimal airport pricing and investment policy could generate roughly $11 billion (1988 dollars) in annual benefits. Travelers reap $8 billion in reduced delay and also would pay lower fares because the expansion in runway capacity called for under optimal investment combined with congestion pricing would reduce congestion to such an extent that, on average, landing fees would fall.
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The annualized cost of the additional runway investment is only about $1.5 billion. Carriers benefit from the lower operating costs from reduced delay. Airports' net revenues would fall slightly, but, as we argue below, they would become financially self-sufficient.
The combination of efficient pricing and efficient investment policies is again economically and politically important. If airports adopted efficient congestion fees alone, there would be considerable redistribution from travelers -who would primarily absorb the higher takeoff and landing fees through higher fares-to airports. The losses to commercial travelers could be softened by reductions in the 8 percent ticket tax used to support air traffic control and airport construction. But general aviation, which would face the largest user fee 10 Optimal runway capacity is determined under the assumption that no additional land is needed for runway expansion. Although this assumption is unreasonable for some airports, other capacityenhancing mechanisms are or will be available that could by themselves produce a similar effect or enable runways to be built closer together at airports with limited room for growth. These mechanisms include high-speed runway exits, microwave landing systems, phased array radar, and digital pilot-air traffic control communications. In any case, this assumption produces an upward bias in the estimate of net benefits. 11 General aviation travelers will face higher landing fees. But the Morrison-Winston model does not account for the greater flexibility that general aviation travelers have in their choice of airport and arrival and departure time, thus their loss is overstated. increase, would remain uncompensated and mount heavy opposition to this change.
12
Combining efficient pricing and investment would postpone the need to build expensive new airports. The FAA estimates that the new Denver airport will reduce current delays at the Denver Stapleton airport by 35 percent to 50 percent. Optimal pricing and investment at Stapleton would lower delays by at least that much at lower costs (Morrison and Winston, 1989b) . Continued growth in air travel will eventually necessitate constructing new airports, but these decisions will be made more efficiently if we make better use of our current airport capacity.
Because airports are characterized by overall constant returns to scale (Morrison, 1983) , they would be financially self-sufficient under optimal pricing and investment. Their self-sufficiency would help lower the federal government deficit because airports would not need funds from the government to finance improvements.
Efficient Air Transportation Policy and Deregulation
Deregulation of the airline industry has been a success. Winston (1986, 1989a) find that deregulation has provided travelers and 12 General aviation was successful in its opposition to the landing fee increase at Logan (Boston) Airport. But the revised prices at Logan were only applied to small aircraft (fees were actually lowered for larger planes to keep the plan revenue neutral) and were not differentiated by time of day. carriers with $14.9 billion of annual benefits (1988 dollars) . 13 But by lowering fares and accelerating the development of hub and spoke route structures, deregulation has increased the flow of traffic at major airports, which has strained airport capacity and caused delays. Despite popular belief, the source of the delays is not deregulation per se but the failure of airports to undertake optimal pricing and investment. The increased flying activity in the deregulated environment makes this failure all the more costly; Morrison and Winston (1989b) estimate that the potential benefits of deregulation have been lowered by at least $2 billion because of greater travel time.
Today, all airports in the U.S. are publicly owned, usually by local government agencies. Airports' contributions to investments in capacity are financed by bonds that are effectively guaranteed by the airlines. Efficient pricing and investment could reduce the airlines' control over airport investments, especially ones that would enable competitors to have easier access to the airport, because airports would be financially self-sufficient. It has been argued that under use agreements between airlines and airports, airlines can block airport investments in capacity that require them to pay additional fees. By expanding capacity, efficient pricing and investment could also reduce entry barriers that exist at certain airports because carriers are unable to get takeoff and landing slots. (Of course, these additional competitors would need to obtain gate space, also.) New entry could be facilitated, putting downward pressure on fares and adding to the benefits from deregulation.
Toward Efficient Infrastructure Policy
The potential exists to realize substantial benefits from an efficient infrastructure policy. The annual welfare gain from efficient pricing and investment of highways and airports advocated here approaches $25 billion, and it can be obtained for only about $2.7 billion in annualized capital expenditures to increase road thickness and to build more runways. Benefits would actually be higher than these estimates suggest because performance in the deregulated airline and trucking industries would improve. And efficient infrastructure policy can at the same time effectively address the major concerns with deregulation, air travel delays and entry barriers at airports. The conclusion is clear and inescapable: public spending on infrastructure should certainly be increased, but it should be done efficiently and be accompanied by efficient pricing. Indeed, efficient pricing is a prerequisite to making efficient infrastructure investments. 14 Leadership at the federal level would help shape an efficient infrastructure policy. One useful step would be for the federal government to require that requests for federal grants for highway and airport capacity improvements include a plan to reduce capital needs by efficient pricing and efficient investment. Unfortunately, current federal policy as stated in the National Transportation Plan (U.S. DOT, 1990 ) only mentions efficient pricing and investment in a vague way, if at all, and usually refers to it in connection with inefficient policies.
The best hope for sensible policy reform may reside with the states. Oregon has recently introduced an axle-weight tax for selected trucks and several locales in California are seriously exploring congestion pricing. There has also been support in California newspapers for congestion pricing (see the editorials cited in Small, Winston, and Evans (1989) , p. 92). These states have recognized (and perhaps others will too) that the current federal emphasis on supporting increases in infrastructure spending with such means as higher state gasoline taxes will fail to provide a permanent solution to recurring infrastructure problems. Steps must be taken to stop passing these problems on to future generations.
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